Addressing Extreme Poverty in Hungary – How the Development Sector is working with, and for, Communities

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Executive Summary

One quarter of the European Union’s population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, and this proportion has not changed significantly over the past decade. Among those at the risk, the number of people belonging to the following groups is particularly high: young people, children, people with a low level of education, unemployed people and migrants. One tenth of the Union’s population is living in a disadvantaged situation, which means that two out of the three factors (income, low work intensity or material deprivation) affect them.

In each dimension of poverty, Hungary ranks in the bottom tier of European Union members, though, according to the latest CSO (Central Statistical Office) data, we can see a rapid improvement in terms of work intensity and the lessening of material deprivation. In 2014, 30% of Hungarian households were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, while 3% lived at a disadvantage in all three dimensions, according to the EU definition. Poverty levels in Eastern Europe differ from the EU average in the sense that it has a very significant ethnic ‘undertone’: the Roma living in these countries are more likely to belong to the group of poor people than the non-Roma.

According to the official data collection 310,000 Roma live in Hungary; while researchers estimate this to be around 7-800,000. More than 80% of the Hungarian Roma lives in poverty; they are overrepresented in all tested poverty categories. The causes of their social and economic marginalisation are low educational attainment, low and typically low-paid employment, poor housing conditions, and poor health - together forming a complex set of problems. All of this is reinforced through the discrimination of the Roma people by non-Roma in society, and through the frequent institutional segregation.

The national development policy has changed over time rather hectically, and it has not been uniform in targeting extreme poverty. There are development programmes spanning government and EU aid programme cycles, but their frameworks and approaches vary. The current Hungarian government increasingly assigns tasks and sources to the churches - both in terms of social and educational services. Besides this, a significant part of EU funds serves the operation of public institutions, or these institutions are the implementing bodies of the EU programmes. This is the result of a rather conservative image of society, in which the civil actors, who participated meaningfully in the past decades at local or national level in the social development processes, now get increasingly less significant a role and less interventional opportunity. The size of grants available as development funds and accessible for civil society organisations, is annually around HUF 84 billion (EUR 271 million) between 2014-2020.

The complex development programmes implemented within the framework of the State are reserved about answering questions around tackling school segregation, or providing integrated living environments. The needed professional background to implement these programmes has not always been available, or was only available during any one grant period. Therefore, sustained and significant improvement could not have been expected in the short term as a result of these programmes.
1. Introduction

The Badur Foundation (hereinafter the Foundation) started its work in 2014 in Hungary, and produced an analysis of the Hungarian civil sector, especially focusing on those living in extreme poverty, and on those organisations, that aim to support them. As the Roma are overrepresented among people living in extreme poverty in Hungary, Roma organisations, associations and funders supporting Roma communities also received greater emphasis in the analysis.

This study is an update, since it aims to provide more up-to-date data concerning the issues covered in the earlier analysis, and some questions will be discussed in more detail. Any topic that arises in this analysis, we wish to present from a point of view that is of interest and importance to the present and future work of the Foundation.

This report also aims to present the national, regional, and local initiatives aimed at reducing extreme poverty to a wider audience.

2. The Aspects of Poverty

Since this analysis discusses Hungarian poverty, and the sector that is in place to improve the situation, the terms 'poverty', 'extreme poverty', 'exclusion' and 'multiple disadvantaged' appear quite often. Their use in the public discourse is not uniform, and in many cases, professional reports refer to the terms without accurate definitions either. The following part briefly summarizes the meaning of each term, and subsequently we will refer to them accordingly.

Poverty is a term used here to describe the relative position of individuals and groups. The World Bank prepares income-related global poverty assessments and statements and calculates the daily and consolidated income poverty line, bound by the purchasing power parity method. This was 1.9 dollars in 2015. This poverty line methodically tries to eliminate the regional and cultural differences, but it is clear that there is still a different meaning to the poverty line in different parts of the world. (Converted to Forints, this amount is around HUF 15,600/ EUR 50 in a month). The fact that globally - as cited in the World Bank report - the number of people living under the unified poverty line has decreased does not mean that the situation of the Hungarian people living in poverty has improved.

Researchers conventionally determine income poverty relative to a country's median income, but it is very important to note that this definition is, in all cases, a political issue. The European Union, including Hungary uses 60% of the median income as the poverty threshold. Extreme poverty does not have a more precise definition, which would bind the index to a certain, relative or objective value. So, any definition of extreme poverty is a subjective call by policymakers and researchers. According to the CSO, those with an income below 40% of the median income live

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2 The median income does not equal to the average income. The median income divides the income distribution into two equal groups i.e. half having income above that amount, and half having income below that amount. The average income indicates the amount and standard deviation of the incomes, in contrast, the median shows the income distribution. The median income is in most cases lower than the average income. All this in more detail, see: Havasi, Éva – Altorjai, Szilvia, A jövedelem mint az anyagi jólét és a szegénység mérőszáma. Társadalomtitkosítási Füzetek 43. szám, KSH, Budapest, 2005.
in extreme poverty, while other sociologists consider the amount of the minimum old age pension as the limit of extreme poverty.\(^3\)

In addition to income poverty, the European Union (including Hungary) applies a complex indicator of other elements such as material deprivation and low work intensity in order to measure the “risk of poverty and social exclusion”.\(^4\)

Such an index attempts to show the absoluteness of poverty: that this life situation means not only scarce income or access to material goods, but also the significant reduction of employees' competencies and social capital – so that poverty can be measured and presented in a more complex way.\(^5\) In addition, poverty - because of its complexity - can lead to psychological handicaps such as the continuous sense of shame\(^6\), and can also result in the reduction of cognitive competences.\(^7\)

It is important to note that the research data cited here is the result of large-scale quantitative statistical tests that are becoming increasingly nuanced and therefore better able to more deeply describe the characteristics of poverty and exclusion. At the same time, they are often still unable to present the dynamics and underlying drives underlying extreme poverty.\(^8\) However, these figures are standardized and available at European level, and - within the above-described limits – give the opportunity for comparison.

The previously presented relative poverty indicators have been contextualised alongside so-called minimum subsistence figures compiled by statisticians, in which a consumer’s shopping basket — should include consumer products necessary for basic living and the average annual cost of such items. Consequently, this indicator helps to define who is not reaching the required income level for these basic purchases to be made. The CSO abolished the calculation of a subsistence figure in 2015 - it now aims to measure the minimum living wage using a different method.\(^9\)

This report provides further details about all of the aforementioned categories and presents European and Hungarian poverty data. Before that, this chapter will close by looking at how

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\(^3\) See the interview of Czibere, Ibolya: [http://hvg.hu/iththon/201449_valasszol_czibereSzegenysegkutato_sociologus_a](http://hvg.hu/iththon/201449_valasszol_czibereSzegenysegkutato_sociologus_a)

\(^4\) Definitions:
- a) Income poverty describes those earning less than 60% of the median income;
- b) 'Material deprivation' means inadequate access to material goods and financial disadvantage. The materially deprived are considered to be those that - by their own admission – are affected by at least four of the following nine conditions:
  1. Being in payment arrears related to loan repayments or housing;
  2. Lack of adequate heating at home;
  3. Inability to face unexpected expenses;
  4. Lack of meat, fish, or equivalent source of protein to consume every other day;
  5. Lack of one-week annual holiday spent away from home;
  6. Because of financial reasons do not have a car;
  7. Because of financial reasons do not have a washing machine;
  8. Because of financial reasons do not have a colour television;
  9. Because of financial reasons do not have a telephone;
- c) Low work intensity households are defined as those in which the working age population (18-59 years) adults have spent less than 20% of their full work potential with work.

\(^5\) To read more about how the indexes refer to different poverty indicators in more detail, see in: Havasi, Éva, Szegénység, számolva és számolatlanul, Költség Mérce, 2017, [http://kettosmerce.blog.hu/2017/01/08/havasi_eva_szegenyseg_szamolva_es_szamolatlanul](http://kettosmerce.blog.hu/2017/01/08/havasi_eva_szegenyseg_szamolva_es_szamolatlanul).

\(^6\) Havasi, Éva ibid.


\(^8\) On critiques concerning these different methodological questions, see also in the referred article by Havasi, Éva.

different definitions of poverty appear in the context of local development programmes referred to in this report. For example, in almost every case, social integration programmes present detailed indicators when determining a target group, delineating a segment of the poor as the intended beneficiaries of the programme.

In these target group definitions, the following indicators are typically included as filters: a) the individual's (or household's) income status, b) education level, c) labour market status, d) in the case of some projects, the housing circumstances. These indicators are typically in either-or relation, so that it is “enough to meet” one dimension of the needed criteria for someone to become a beneficiary of a specific project. Another method of determining the target group is, when instead of social targeting, the delineation is geographical, so the entire population of the least-developed micro-regions and settlements are involved in the proposed development. These issues will be discussed in more detail later on.

A central definition of extreme poverty has been developed only once before, in the frame of the “Community Upgrade for the Integration of People Living in Extreme Poverty” development programme (Social Renewal Operational Programme -SoROP 5.1.3-09), which described that:

“… Communities that have sunk into deep poverty are characterised by very low education and employment rates, strong local and regional residential concentration, segregation and – resulting from all of the above - severe social deficits, and the very high probability of reproduction of these adverse social conditions. Based on these criteria those living in extreme poverty, meet at least two of the following criteria:

- They have been unemployed for at least three years, or, during this period have at most participated in the public work scheme
- Their highest education level is 10th grade, and even if they have additional vocational qualification it is not-marketable
- They belong to the working age population (18-60 years), but are professionally inactive
- They are raising more than two children."^{10}

As can be seen, this definition used a more complex approach rather than simply the income borderline approach to describe poverty. As such, this report employs this methodology, that is, when ‘extreme poverty’ or communities living in extreme poverty are mentioned, what is meant is the complex definition. When citing statistical data, the report will also specify definitions and methodology behind data collection.

3. Poverty Data in Europe

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Eurostat measures the poverty of the EU’s population on three dimensions. The combined set of the three categories gives an impression of the group of people most at risk of poverty or social exclusion, and the intersections of the individual dimensions indicate the people living in multiple disadvantaged situation. Based on the Eurostat data for 2014, one quarter of the EU’s population belongs to the first group; this rate has changed only

slightly over the past decade. It is important to highlight that the EU poverty statistics became worse as CEE countries accessed the EU. That said, even without the CEE data, the ratio of inhabitants at risk of poverty is 21-23%. Therefore, poverty in Europe is a general problem, which smites even the richest EU countries, as much as it does those recently-joined member states.

The analysis of Eurostat underlines the following points:\textsuperscript{11}:

- More than 30\% of young people aged 18 to 24 and 27.8\% of children aged less than 18 were at risk of poverty in 2014. The rate was 17.8\% amongst those aged 65 or over.
- Of all groups examined, the unemployed faced the greatest risk of poverty or social exclusion, at 66.7\%.
- Almost 50\% of all single parents were at risk in 2014. This was double the average and higher than for any other household type analysed.
- 35\% of adults with lower secondary school educational attainment levels were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2014.
- 63.8\% of children of parents with pre-primary and lower secondary education levels were at risk as well.
- The migrant background was also a key factor: in 2014, 40.1\% of adults born in a country outside the EU-28 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. For native citizens, however, only 22.5\% of the population was at this risk.
- On the average not too significant, but measurable is the settlement-level difference. EU-28 citizens in rural areas were on average more likely to live in poverty or social exclusion than those living in urban areas (27.2\% compared with 24.3\%) in 2014.
- Income poverty was the most widespread form of poverty with 17.2\% of EU citizens affected in 2014. Next were low work intensity and severe material deprivation affecting 11.2\% and 9\% of EU citizens.
- One third of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion are affected at least in two poverty dimensions; 9.8 million people (3\% of EU citizens) are affected by all three.

People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion

(Million cap., EU-28)

Hungary ranks in the lowest tier in all poverty dimensions among EU Member States, and this situation has not fundamentally changed over the past decade. The rate of those, affected by the certain dimensions of poverty is the highest in Hungary among the Visegrad countries. 10 years ago, the same indicators of Slovakia were similar and in Poland were much worse than the Hungarian ones. In the last decade, they have improved significantly in both countries. In contrast, the Hungarian data on the risk of poverty or social exclusion is still around 30%, while in the mentioned countries it decreased to 18-25%. In Hungary, the rate of those living in poverty and at risk of social exclusion could not be reduced in the past decade. In other words, while ten years ago Hungarian data was comparable with those of the Visegrad countries, nowadays Hungary appears in the same group as Bulgaria and Romania, at the end of the EU lists.

The reasons for, and impact of poverty in Hungary as in the rest of Europe are similar: households with children and low work intensity are at risk. The dimensions of poverty in Eastern European countries are complimented by an additional element, the Roma population.

Although in this analysis only Hungarian data is discussed in detail, it should be recapitulated that, in the Balkan countries as well as in Central Europe, the Roma communities have a higher probability of being in poverty.\(^\text{12}\)

Source: Eurostat, 2016

Poverty Dimensions in Hungary in 2014

Source: Eurostat, 2016
4. **The Sources of Poverty Data in Hungary**

Although polls on poverty in Hungary have been taking place since the '80s, they were methodologically not consistent, continuous, and the data taken up in the different years, by various research institutes are not necessarily comparable. The mostly sociographic, interview analysis-based, qualitative researches were supplemented later on by large-scale, statistical surveys; however, poverty was equivalent to a low status in the social and economic hierarchy. The most continuously undertaken data collection and analysis was the Hungarian Household Panel, conducted by TÁRKI Research Institute in the early '90s - the results inevitably reported about the social exclusion of some groups because of the political changes. The mapping, description, and measurement of the evolving poverty after the political change have almost two decades of history.

The aforementioned research was carried out simultaneously with other surveys on Roma also looking into the issue of poverty - these were analytical works describing the social hierarchies. In the early 90’s, data protection laws were very restrictive about the collection of ethnic data - this is one reason why, although the same large-scale, detailed studies were made regularly, the ethnic identity was not questioned in those.

The 2011 census brought changes to this issue, when the first series of questions permitted to assess multiple identities - these are still part of the CSO’s data recordings. Because of its EU membership, the CSO had to provide data for the European Statistical System. In these, data on ethnicity has also been collected since 2014.13 (The most detailed data of these types is from the EU-SILC – Examination of Income and Living Conditions in the framework of European Labour Force Survey. The same type of data collection is not available yet on housing, education or health, although the level of education is present as a category in the labour market questionnaire.)

It is important to point out that both governmental and non-governmental reports and analyses differ considerably. Governmental reports are mainly based on the data of the CSO (or on Eurostat survey results, measured by the CSO), and typically highlight the decreasing number of people living with multiple disadvantages, as well as the declining unemployment data. In contrast, non-governmental, civil reports focus on long-term processes and, in addition to the improved indicators of the current year, they emphasize that the outbreak from extreme poverty is, at minimum a mid-term process; additionally, he relativity and fragility of livelihood strategies are highlighted.14

5. **The Number and Proportion of Roma – Why is a Definition Challenging?**

One can have significantly different figures relating to the number of Hungarian Roma depending on whether one takes official statistical data into account, or that estimated by researchers. The reason for the difference - which could be up to two or three times - mainly

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13 The relevant data - broken down by ethnic origin – is presented in the next chapter.
14 This process is explored further in the chapter on unemployment.
stems from the methodology: the official statistics (the census data) are based on self-declaration since 1990, while social research used the methodology of external classification for the sampling.

In the late 1990s, a large-scale debate emerged among Hungarian social scientists in connection with whether it is possible to carry out empirical research on Roma and, if yes, exactly on what basis, and how it could be determined that someone belongs to that ethnic group. The discussion highlighted how much constructed the concept of ethnicity is - although this very important finding could not break through the rigid boundaries either of the policy-making or of public opinion. However, in Hungarian social research, complex sampling methods and target definition are increasingly established.\(^{15}\)

In the census, only those respondents were considered Roma who declared themselves as such. As recently as 2011 the census used a more nuanced questionnaire to allow the nomination of a multiple identity, which means that the respondents could mark that they simultaneously identified as Hungarian and Roma. The former social studies used the method of the so-called external classification, which considered those as Roma whom the environment and the interviewers - based either on external characteristics, or on self-declaration – defined so. The chosen research methodology should serve the research objectives - in this respect, the external classification is also a valid choice. These researches described mainly the demographic characteristics of the Roma ethnic group and intended to map the discriminatory mechanisms that do not operate based on self-declaration but are typically based on physical features. This means that if the non-Roma society discriminate those whom it considers as Roma, even if based on external characteristics, then this group should be the target group of the research. However, this type of research is currently no longer suited to the Roma population in Hungary, as it cannot provide a description about the whole group, due to the sample selection problem. Individuals with higher socio-economic status are increasingly inclined to conceal their identity, and often they are not regarded as being Roma by the public either - for this reason, researches typically "distort downwards" and the data of only Roma living in extreme poverty are likely to be included. Regarding the external classification, naturally, very serious criticisms of fundamental rights exist, and - amongst other reasons -this sampling method is in itself therefore no longer used.\(^{16}\)

In sum, determining the number of Roma in Hungary is complicated because of the data protection laws, because of the obvious novelty for the Hungarian society to assume multiple identities and because of the changing intensity of discriminatory mechanisms and the specific individual or group behavioural responses to them.


\(^{16}\) In a 2010 survey, the researchers worked with two sub-samples: with one group, in which were people classified as Roma by Roma, and with another group, in which were people classified as Roma by non-Roma. For this see Kurucz Erika (Ed.), Élethelyzetek a társadalom peremén, NCSSZI, 2010, http://www.ncsszi.hu/tamop-5_4_1-08_/v_-piller---kutatas/romakutatas.
### Data on the Number of Hungarian Roma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Estimated number of Roma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Sociological Survey</td>
<td>External Classification</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Census</td>
<td>Self-Declaration</td>
<td>142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Sociological Survey</td>
<td>External Classification</td>
<td>468,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Census</td>
<td>Self-Declaration</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Sociological Survey</td>
<td>External Classification</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Census</td>
<td>Self-Declaration – multiple identity</td>
<td>315,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Sociological Survey</td>
<td>Self-Declaration + External Classification</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Demographic Projection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of the whole Hungarian population</th>
<th>Estimated number of Roma population</th>
<th>Estimated rate of Roma population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>10,374,800</td>
<td>448,100</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10,198,300</td>
<td>549,700</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9,985,700</td>
<td>657,600</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>774,200</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>733,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>814,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question of identity has not only social science measurement-related importance, but also serious consequences on development policy. For many years, in national development policy, one core issue has been the dichotomy of affirmative action vs. geographic targeting. In other words, how the broadly defined policy should support the less developed municipalities and communities: targeting only the most disadvantaged social groups including the Roma living in extreme poverty, or should it try to improve the whole area, based not on social, but on geographic targeting.

The answers obviously have consequences for financial resources too (a territorial approach obviously requires more resources). However, through geographic targeting, people living in

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extreme poverty have much less access to the resources, proportionally, even on a smaller scale than when using a method of affirmative action.

The territorial principle means, not only a geographical impoundment but also the social network of an area, with all its constraints, its operational principle, and its petrified or ever dynamic local hierarchy. This means that resources have to travel through too many steps before reaching those in need. On the other hand, the affirmative action might turn into a kind of unintended side effect and becomes counterproductive: citizens living in poor conditions can turn against the supported ethnic groups living in extreme poverty, thereby increasing the already existing social distances. This makes the effective utilisation of local networks problematic without which the implementation and maintenance of local development becomes questionable.

The Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy specifies the Hungarian Roma population as an ethnic group, which needs a separate development support policy. The funds do not specify specific national or ethnic quotas; however, the participating organisations need to continuously provide data on how many of the participants consider themselves as Roma in the project planning process as well as during the implementation phase. (Even at an individual level, they must complete and collect declarations, followed by adequate data protection procedures. The collected national identity and self-declarations do not always coincide with the data of self-declaration based census or even with the minority government data.) At the same time, it is quite random and depends from site to site, if the local community defines a project as a Roma programme.
6. Roma and Extreme Poverty

6.1 Poverty

According to research data, 30% of the Hungarian population is at risk of poverty, representing nearly 3 million people. With this ratio, Hungary was the fifth worst in the EU in 2014. Between the country differences amounting to 2-3%, it is perhaps more important that Hungary with its current data has stood in the lower third of the Union in a consistent manner.

If we look at the specific poverty data broken down by ethnicity\(^{19}\), the high over-representation of Roma stands out: whilst 27% of those living in poverty Hungary in 2015 were non-Roma in the same year, 84% were Roma. (This is an incredibly high figure, even in comparison to the 90% relative statistic in the previous year.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion between Roma and non-Roma Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: EU-SILC, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated previously, poverty or social exclusion can be seen to be compiled of three dimensions with three indicators: relative income poverty, low work intensity and severe material deprivation. If one examines the ethnic breakdown of these indicators, one sees the following picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Income Poverty Rate between Roma and non-Roma Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: EU-SILC, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of People living in Severe Material Deprivation between Roma and non-Roma Population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: EU-SILC, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{19}\) The data referred in this chapter is taken from different data collections of the CSO, in which ethnicity was measured by questions relating to multiple identity – respectively this builds upon previous Census data. This means, that this data refers to the respondents, who declare themselves as Roma (too). - See Chapter 5.
The data shows that - in all the indicators - the Roma population has multiple disadvantages, even if the current year's data shows signs of improvement. The greatest development is in the case of labour market conditions; however, this improvement is due the extension of the public work scheme\textsuperscript{20} and less to do with the impact of integration into the primary labour market. Because of the aforementioned public employment scheme, and because of the effect of increasing employment abroad, Hungary’s national unemployment statistics became one of the best in the EU. Nonetheless, the rate of people employed for very low wages - has not reduced. Some research suggests that nearly a million people are earning less in a month than those on the minimum subsistence.\textsuperscript{21} Early school leavers, career starters, participants of the public work scheme, and public sector-employees are particularly at risk.\textsuperscript{22}

This is especially interesting in the sense that, according to current surveys, the Roma households live on half as much money as non-Roma. Therefore, Roma are included in the secondary labour market, and this is associated with the income growth per household. But this level of income is not sufficient to break away from the other dimensions of poverty. Their housing conditions, or their access to durable consumer goods, could not significantly change. However, it is worth noting, that public opinion about the public work scheme is not uniform, and mostly, political affiliation determines opinions. Critics\textsuperscript{23} highlight the sanctional nature of the public work scheme (it must be undertaken to get the minimum social assistance; all this is linked to a local, unequal power status), or focus on its dead-end character (public workers do not have access to the primary labour market; the public work scheme simply keeps those in it just above a subordinate, economically unviable situation). However, there is a Hungarian sociologist who states that, in recent decades, Hungarian social policy has been unable to counter extreme poverty by creating and operating a more effective tool than the public work scheme.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & 2014 & 2015 \\
\hline
Roma & 45,300 & 26,700 \\
non-Roma & 8,400 & 6,600 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Rate of People Living in Households with Low Work Intensity between Roma and non-Roma Population}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{21} About the calculation of minimum subsidy and about the current situation see: Kiss Ambrus, Á dolgozói szegénység és a léthmontimum, http://ujenyenloseg.hu/dolgozoi-szegenyseg-es-a-lethmontimum-2/2/?nopagination.

\textsuperscript{22} Nagy Viktória, Mit lehet tenni a dolgozói szegénység ellen?, http://www.szez.hu/hirek/dolgozoi_szegenyseg.


\textsuperscript{24} “I have been for a long time against the public work scheme. But then Roma told me not to brag, they like it, because they have a little more money, get up in the morning, go to work, even if it does not make much sense of what they are doing. Factually, since 2013, poverty decreased. The public work scheme of course, does not produce the national income, the economy does not improve, but the parks never looked so good, the streets were not so clean since I can remember. The fact is that since the political change the public work scheme is the most workable government deed in extreme poverty alleviation.” Interview with Szélényi, Iván; http://24.hu/kozelet/2016/05/27/szelenyi-ivan-es-akkor-orban-viktor-ugy-szold-hogy-a-fak-nem-nohetnek-az-egg/
It is worth noting, in relation to the public work scheme, that - in its present form - it is actually a conditional form of aid, which has a long-standing history and with this an abundance of literature. The 'workfare' scheme introduced in the '60s in the US, for example, was an alternative to the 'welfare' subsidy system.

In the '90s in Europe, the social democratic Third Way movement\(^{25}\) brought this type of public employment into ‘fashion’ again. The Gyurcsány government in 2008 initiated the forerunner of the current Hungarian public work scheme, the “Pathways to Work Programme”, although the programme’s extension and transformation is reflective of the current conservative (FIDESZ-KDNP) government.

### Annual Average Net Income per Consumption Unit (OECD2*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Annual average income (HUF)</th>
<th>Monthly average income (HUF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Roma</td>
<td>1,550,000</td>
<td>129,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>868,000</td>
<td>72,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,522,000</td>
<td>126,833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU-SILC, 2014 (reference year: 2013)

*OECD2: The size of the consumption unit represented by the household-dwelling unit is indicated as the sum of the weights of its members.
- first adult aged 18 and over = 1.0
- subsequent adults aged 18 and over = 0.5
- each person aged under 14 = 0.3

Analysing the causes of poverty, one can see a complex picture, which shows that educational, social, employment, housing and health status closely relate to each other in a system. This means that any intervention that focuses only on one dimension cannot remedy the complete system of causes and bring about an end to extreme poverty - only complex, simultaneous interventions and management promise more success. From the causes of poverty, let us now examine three in further detail: employment, education and housing.

#### 6.2 Employment

The low rate of employment has, for decades, been one of Hungary’s major social problems. The country is far from the EU objective of a 75% employment rate, having a rate of 54% at national level. But, within that, the employment rate of Roma is very low (32%). It follows that the inactivity rate is relatively high in Hungary; the data of the Roma is 13% higher than of the non-Roma. These proportions are more balanced, however, between the long-term unemployed: within unemployed Roma and non-Roma groups, 54% and 57% are long-term unemployed (although one has to take into account that this proportion applies within 6.7% non-Roma and 30% Roma respondents).

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The low employment rate of Roma dates back to Hungary’s political transition. In the early '90s mining, heavy industry and public construction were the biggest employers of Hungarian Roma. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Hungary’s labour market narrowed significantly and has not expanded ever since (7 million employed decreased to 4 million). There were no structural changes that could have enabled mass employment of Roma.

### Employment Data (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Roma Population</th>
<th>Roma Population</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactivity rate</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate(^{26})</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Unemployed Rate</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KSH, Labour Force Survey 2014

### 6.3 Education

Another reason for the low level of employment is the low educational levels and non-marketable qualifications of Roma people. The education level of the Roma population has increased substantially in recent decades, but it is still significantly lower than that of the non-Roma. According to the Labour Force Survey of the CSO in 2014, more than 80% of the Roma population has completed a maximum of eight years of elementary schooling and did not obtain a higher degree of education. It is important to note that the Hungarian education system is one of the slowest changing sectors, which means that a few years of educational expansion can only slightly improve distribution of an entire population. Theoretically, it could be expected that, among younger generations, there is not as big a difference as in the total population - but unfortunately, this is not that the case. The category of early school leavers refers to young people between the ages of 18 and 24, who leave the education system without a secondary degree. The strategic aim of the EU is that this ratio should be under 10% by 2020 - in Hungary this figure is 12.8% nationally. If we look at the Roma - non-Roma breakdown, however, we find that 57% of Roma youths aged between 18-24 years belong to the early school leaver group, so there is a high chance that they will not acquire neither secondary nor vocational qualifications. Similar data is measured by the so-called NEET rate\(^{27}\), which includes young people aged between 15 and 24 years, who do not go to any school or training, nor are working – i.e those, who are inactive dependants. Within the total population, the rate is 14% whilst among the Roma it is 38%. The fact that Roma youths drop out so soon, without any formal result from the education system, anticipates that their subsequent positions in the labour market are not promising either. In other words, the education system is very effectively reproducing a group of potentially unemployed. (In recent months, the Ministry of Human Capacities will launch a major

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\(^{26}\) The unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed within the economically active population. Those are considered to be unemployed who did not work during the reference week (the week of questioning), who do not have a job which they were temporarily away from during the four weeks before the interview, who were not actively looking for work, who would be able to work within two weeks on finding a suitable job or, if having already found a job, could start working within 90 days. Furthermore, those who have been unemployed for 12 months or longer, are considered to be long-term unemployed.

\(^{27}\) NEET: Nor in Education Employment or Training (“not learning and not working either”).
programme to reduce early school leaving - the results will only be available in a few years. The programme details are not public yet, but it is questionable as to whether it would be able to substantively change the problems and anomalies of the current school system - such as the age limit of compulsory education lowered to 16 years, the operation of so-called 'collecting' schools in ghettoized areas, or the maintenance of a segregated education system).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest completed level of education</th>
<th>Non-Roma Population</th>
<th>Roma Population</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 8 elementary classes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 elementary classes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational school, secondary school</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school degree</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early school leavers (18-24 years)</th>
<th>Non-Roma Population</th>
<th>Roma Population</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEET rate (15-24 years)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.4 Housing

Housing poverty is also a complex social phenomenon. It encompasses access to housing, its cost, size and structure, the size of housing-related costs, the housing quality itself and the related quality of life, and of course, the segregated or integrated nature of housing, too. Since the survey conducted by István Kemény all data confirms that the housing situation of Roma is significantly worse than of the non-Roma population. This appears in various forms of housing exclusion: worse (in many cases critical) housing quality, housing in peripheral location, territorial concentration, often accompanied by illegal or uncertain legal status. One of the key questions related to housing of Roma, are the segregated settlements, on which we cannot provide recent data.

According to a survey commissioned by the National Development Agency in 2010, there are around 1,600 segregated areas, in 800 settlements, occupied by 300,000 people, which is 3% of the total Hungarian population. It is important to note that the survey collected data from segregated places, but not about the inhabitants' ethnicity – as such, this does not necessarily mean having 1,600 Roma settlements. The researchers also rely on studies of István Kemény and

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28 A végzettség nélküli iskolaelhagyás elleni középtávú stratégia, http://www.kormany.hu/download/5/fc/20000/Y%C3%A9zetts%C3%A9g%20tartalma%20iskolaelhagy%C3%A9%A1s.pdf
his colleagues, who in 2004 stated\textsuperscript{30} that residential segregation has not improved, but its form has been transformed in the last 30 years – and two-thirds of Roma continue to live in segregated circumstances.\textsuperscript{31}

Settlements, segregated areas: numbers and locations

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{settlements_diagram}
\caption{Telep, településövezet ágyazott szegregáció száma (darab)}
\end{figure}

Source: Domokos, Veronika, The location and infrastructural condition of poor slums, Roma settlements and urban segregated areas. 2010. Unpublished manuscript.

In connection with housing poverty and segregated areas it is currently possible to get accurate data at municipal level (local governments may request the CSO’s segregated area-containment, and their basic demographical, ethnic data), but this data is not nationally aggregated and analysed. Based on the 2011 census data, one could create a countrywide map of segregated areas including ethnic data, but this has not taken place yet. However, from the data of the 2011 census, one can see what the differences are between the Roma and non-Roma living conditions (taking into consideration the limits of the ethnic data break down as detailed in Chapter 5.). On this basis, one can see that nearly one third of Roma are affected by severe housing poverty, meaning that they live in buildings with no or very low level of comfort. The official data on infrastructure measured by the CSO, is somewhat contradicted by the daily field experience: according to the census data, only in 1.4\% of the Roma households, there is no electricity. This


\textsuperscript{31} The transformation of segregated housing can be characterized as follows: the so-called Cs [abbreviation for lowered comfort level]-colonies were set up in the 60-70s. These were later partially abolished and newly built through "social welfare building" (but still consisting from low-quality buildings). As a result, "gypsy house lines" were established. After the elimination of social policy support in 2009 the resurgence of the so-called wild sites can be increasingly observed, and in the villages the buildings inhabited by Roma go through a generational expansion (i.e. that the newer generations build rooms without comfort connected to the houses of their parents – thereby recreating classic settlement conditions).
is, however, very low and at odds with the frequency with which field workers see houses without electricity due to debts and so-called ‘electricity theft’ in segregated areas.

In 18% of the households inhabited by Roma, there is no running water. In close to 30% there is no bathroom and in 78% of the buildings there is no central heating. In general, it can be said that, whilst 3.5% of the non-Roma population live in crowded conditions (more than two people per room), this ratio is 34% in the case of Roma households. According to the (albeit not representative) survey of UNDP\textsuperscript{32} carried out in 2011, 29% of the Roma population in Hungary lives in poor quality (ruined) dwellings; 30% have no access to public water supplies, one third has no access to public sanitation, and a huge amount (81%) use wood for heating. The Roma live in more crowded households than the national average. According to the UNDP survey, in Roma households there are 0.68 rooms per person compared to 1.3 rooms in the case of non-Roma households. According to the 2012 report of Habitat, half of the Roma population (52%) live in households that, in most cases, delay upkeep payments to their water or electricity providers.\textsuperscript{33}

### Infrastructural and Comfort Level-related differences between Households with non-Roma and Roma Head of Household in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Household</th>
<th>non-Roma</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bathroom</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>68.7%</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electricity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No running water</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water from public utility, conduit</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water from house conduit (e.g. from well with pump)</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heating</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No heating opportunity</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each room with convector or stove</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central - one or more dwellings heating boiler</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District heating (through pipeline from heat centre)</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comfort level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{32} The cited UNDP survey is not representative; there were questionnaire interviews conducted with Roma living in segregated areas and with non-Roma respondents living in similar circumstances.

With all amenities 62.1% 20.6% 61.3%
With principal amenities 30.7% 40.7% 30.9%
With part of amenities 2.5% 10.8% 2.7%
Without comforts heating 3.9% 26.0% 4.4%

Tenure status
Owner (beneficiary) 91.6% 82.8% 91.4%
Tenant 7.1% 14.7% 7.2%
Other grounds 1.3% 2.5% 1.4%

Differences between Roma and non-Roma Households with Roma and non-Roma Head of Households regarding the Size of Dwellings, Room Number per capita and Crowding in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Household</th>
<th>non-Roma</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of rooms</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic area (sq. m)</td>
<td>79.10</td>
<td>73.38</td>
<td>78.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of residents</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of residents/room</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sq. m/capita</td>
<td>39.90</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>39.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowding (more than 2 people/room)</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>34.60</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


7. Social Inclusion Assistance

In the following section, the various support structures are reviewed through which the support of communities living in extreme poverty is realisable followed by the results of some complex support programmes.

Since Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, its national development policy is determined by the support structure and associated conditionality of the EU - the vast majority of the developments in Hungary are realised using EU funds. (The allocation of EU funds depends on decisions at a national domestic level, but certain development directions and targets are put in place by, and must get pre-approval from the EU). The EU plans in seven-year budget periods; between 2014 and 2020, Hungary can obtain EUR 35 billion for support. (The rate of support per citizen is the second highest in the EU.)

EU funds are accessible through Operational Programmes (OP).34 From these funds, the following projects aimed at Roma communities living in extreme poverty are the most relevant:

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- HRD OP (in Hungarian EFOP) – Human Resource Development Operational Programme (programmes related to the improvement of human resources, education, trainings and social supplies);
- EDI OP (in Hungarian GINOP) – Economic Development and Innovation Operational Programme (enterprise development, including social enterprises and social cooperatives, too);
- TSD OP (in Hungarian TOP) – Territorial and Settlement Development Operational Programme (the former regional development resources, local infrastructure development, e.g. complex settlement upgrading programmes);
- ARD OP (in Hungarian VP) – Agricultural and Rural Development OP (to this category belongs e.g. the LEADER programme, which enables the implementation of locally planned and evaluated projects).

The government publishes timings and allocated budget frameworks of the OPs at the beginning of each year, after the adoption of the budget law. Generally, the government’s preferences for the period 2014-20 are business development, in order to increase employment rates and improve market competitiveness. The civil society actors, working on deep poverty alleviation and for the equal opportunities of Roma, are mostly eligible to apply for HRD OP sources.\(^{35}\) However, within that OP, the role of the state is increasingly significant, meaning that more and more programmes get prioritised support, and these programmes are exclusively implemented by public institutions. EU funds are available not only through the national structure, but through so-called direct applications. However, regarding the number of funded projects, and the total amount of these sources, the overall volume of these direct applications represents a much smaller proportion than the resources available at national level (the next chapter addresses the implementation of organisations in detail).

In addition to EU funds, the Norwegian Civil Fund and the Swiss Fund distribute resources for social development in Hungary. These funds support some large-scale investments too, but it is also possible to bid for the so-called civil funds to realise small-scale, local projects.

The range of non-governmental supporters is becoming more and more important in Hungary. Large corporations provide the most support, often as part of the Corporate Responsibility strategy of multinational companies. For now, only a few private donors are working in Hungary, but this part of the sector is also emerging and developing.\(^{36}\) It is significant that some of the private foundations are both donors and applicants - an adoption of a profit maximisation - cost minimisation business model (E.g. Vodafone, T-Mobile, Velux, TEVA, Erste Bank, MOL, OTP Bank, Szerencsejáték Zrt.).

In connection with the private donors, one should acknowledge, in particular, the Soros Foundation\(^{37}\), though it is rather a global institutional system, than a national donor. The foundation currently has no regular calls for Roma civil organisations; funds are accessible on ad-

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\(^{35}\) Not exclusively, but typically, the calls of the HRD OP are aimed to support human development services, which Roma and pro-Roma organizations are also eligible to apply for. The RD OP may appeal to them in a much smaller proportion, and within that especially the LEADER programme. This OP aims more at business and economic development.

\(^{36}\) See also: Hungarian Donors Forum, http://www.donorsforum.hu/hu/tagok.

\(^{37}\) The Hungarian bureau of the Soros Foundation has been closed for almost a decade; the network is still active through the Open Society Institute and through the CEU.
hoc basis through the Roma Educational Fund or through the Roma Initiatives. The foundation shifted its focus to Roma public life and movement, and to the improvement of equal chances.

The EU Funds cover three different groups of funds: a) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), b) Cohesion Fund, c) European Social Fund (ESF). All these funds – in varying measure – are complemented by national governmental sources; the level of these is fixed in a recent partnership agreement, relevant for the recent budget cycle. Between 2007 and 2013, the distribution of EU sources according to the three main funds was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Name</th>
<th>EU Funds (billion EUR)</th>
<th>National Funds (billion EUR)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)</td>
<td>12,650</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>14,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion Fund (CF)</td>
<td>8,642</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>10,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Social Fund (ESF)</td>
<td>3,629</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>4,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,921</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,397</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,318</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other resources</td>
<td>10,378</td>
<td>2,833</td>
<td>13,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,299</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,230</strong></td>
<td><strong>42,529</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table below shows the EU resources allocated for Hungary between 2014-20:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Name</th>
<th>The rate from the whole support (%)</th>
<th>EU Funds (billion EUR)</th>
<th>National Funds (billion EUR)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDI OP (Economic Development and Innovation OP)</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2869.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSD OP (Territorial and Settlement Development OP)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1175.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCH OP (Competitive Central Hungary OP)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>259.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cohesion Funds</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>4304.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRD OP (Human Resource Development OP)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>796.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE OP (Environment and Energy OP)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1075.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD OP (Transport Development OP)</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>997.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS OP (Public Administration and Services OP)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>11 588.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRD OP – accessible for NGOs (estimated data)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>239.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI OP 5 (From economic development OP Employment and social enterprise related funds)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The social-development funds are primarily accessible through the HRD OP, but this framework also includes the resources allocated for state institutions. The resources available to civil society organisations are one third of the whole OP budget.

The Norwegian Civil Fund and the Swiss Fund operate independently from the EU fund (given that these countries are not member states), but in both the technical and operational senses they are synchronised with EU grants available (the donor organisations have their headquarters in Brussels and, typically, the national governmental EU grant operating body manages the funds locally.)

### The Hungarian Sources of the Norwegian Civil Fund and Swiss Fund between 2007-2013/14:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>2009-14</th>
<th>2008-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Civil Fund</td>
<td>Billion EUR</td>
<td>Billion HUF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Fund</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and youth in need</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment development in South-Hungary</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health programmes in North-Eastern Hungary (focusing on Roma)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of private sponsors has become stronger in Hungary as CSO's research data shows. As a result of this, in 2015, 195 billion HUF was provided by private entities: 40% by banks and financial enterprises, 21% came from individual donors, 23% from foreign donations, and 14% from not-for-profit organisations. (The data can be misleading to the extent that it includes funds donated by banks for their own private foundations, organisations as well.) There is not available any precise data about what organisations have invested their donations in, but one could estimate, according to the CSO statistics, that 9.5% of funds generated by the non-profit organisations went to organisations whose main activity was in education and 8.3% of them to those whose primarily deal with social activities. Based on the issues described above, the sources available for social developments are as follows for the years between 2014 -2020:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>billion EUR</th>
<th>billion HUF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Funds</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian and Swiss Funds</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>102.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Donors</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>238.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>589</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual amount:</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previously, this report has described why the Roma are the most endangered by poverty and social exclusion, and thus why support for them is an extremely important matter. The following

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38 CSO Tables, [https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_eves_3_2](https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_eves_3_2).
sections of this report is an attempt to outline national development policy in order to illustrate what kind of support it offers to solve a selection of the aforementioned problems.

8. Complex Development Programmes

Arguably, the alleviation of extreme poverty can only be most effectively achieved through complex programmes, since the causes are complicated and interlocking. Primarily, state actors are in the position to start and finance complex programmes – because of their high cost Below is presented three governmental development programmes, which have sufficient complexity and, in recent years, played the most significant role regarding Roma integration and extreme poverty alleviation.

8.1 Programme to Combat Child Poverty (PCCP)

Children living in extreme poverty accumulate disadvantages in the early childhood, which the education system and the school are unable to compensate or manage - children lag behind their peers with a better fate practically from the moment of conception. Recognising this articulated the need for the Programme to Combat Child Poverty the primary objective of which is to provide early childhood intervention to reduce the indicated lags and aid development. This means not only providing a variety of development services for children, but also for their parents - the programme is designed to involve family and consider a child’s wider environment. The activities of the programme range from education and employment to health care, with the support of a very strong local community development methodology. The pilot programme (led by the Hungarian Academy of Science ‘s Child Poverty Combating Programme Office) began in 2005 in the ‘micro-region’ of Szécsény and, after 2011, it was integrated into the state development system. In 2016, the third round of the grant programme took place and, recently, the local programme preparation of PCCP has been running in 30 districts. The programme is available in least developed districts (formerly micro-regions) on a ‘by invitation’ basis (although within tender frames, meaning that there was no public tender process, per se, but instead a number of organisations were invited to apply and then a percentage of those applications were honoured). Applicants need to set up consortia in the districts. The expenses of the three-year long programmes are on average HUF 500 million (circa EUR 1.6).

In the next subchapter follows the lessons learned by PCCP.

The programmes were obliged to include the following types of activities:

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39 The founders of the consortia can be local governments, civil organizations, churches and not-for-profit organisations.
In the previous cycle, in eight micro-regions, the PCCP was realised by the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta, the evaluations and methodological materials are available here: http://gyerekesely.maltai.hu/page/8.
Current analysis is available in a summary of the EMET evaluations, done partly by the author of this report.
• Health screenings, associated prevention programmes,
• Early childhood development, Sure Start Children’s Houses,
• Youth, extracurricular learning centre-like programmes,
• Employment supporting programmes,
• Community development and community involvement,
• Provision of missing social professions in the micro regions.

The health-related elements of the micro-regional PCCPs meant screenings and related activities in most cases. The target group for screening varied, ranging from pre-school age to 6-14-year-old children. Based on the screenings, most of the participants got professional care and medical aids (glasses, orthotics). It was not uniform as whether the aids were free of charge or partially paid for by beneficiaries. The screenings generated a number of improvements, which would not have taken place without the programme. (Primarily, the programme provided support through the work of speech therapists, psychologists and developmental teachers.)

In the implementation phase of the programme, a number of problems occurred. In only a few cases could a control test also be done to evaluate the programme elements based on the results. In many cases, avoiding double funding caused problems (as public educational advisers had undertaken developmental work as well, and it was not clear which test or development was taking place from the support of the programme and which was on normative basis). Often other SoROP\textsuperscript{41} programmes were running in the micro-regions with similar goals; the harmonising of those could not always happen previously. The screenings and health programmes, and their implementation in small towns were, of course, a very positive phenomenon. But with good coordination, more people could have been reached more effectively. In summary, the health programmes could primarily contribute to the decrease in micro-regional bottlenecks during the programme period (particularly in terms of experts such as psychologists, speech therapists, developmental teachers, and physiotherapists). However, sadly, after the cessation of external resources, there was no possibility for the continuation and sustainability of such local programmes.

The educational institutional system in Hungary begins with kindergarten, which has been compulsory from three years since September 2015. Before this regulation, in the locations affected by extreme poverty, in many cases \textit{Sure Start Children’s Houses} gave out grants to pay for nursery and pre-school services. The \textit{Sure Start Children’s Houses} programme became a nationwide network, with continuous tenders and regular government subsidies paid on a ‘head-count’ basis. Currently, they mainly develop and support children and their parents under three years.

The most common types of micro-regional education projects were extra-curricular afterschool programme-like projects\textsuperscript{42} and youth clubs. Typically, activities targeted primary school age groups. There were only a couple of exceptions, where secondary school students were involved or college programmes were organised for them. In addition, a common project element was to implement activities related to career choice assistance. Summer camps were inseparable from these activities, even if not necessarily reported as components of the educational programme.

\textsuperscript{41} SoROP (Social Renewal Operational Programme); was the umbrella under which social programmes were supported.

\textsuperscript{42} The extra-curricular afterschool programmes (‘Tanoda-like projects’) are not identical to Tanoda programmes: the latter had had to work based on a previously defined standard, connected with a strict administration system, the former has covered youth programmes which - similar to Tanoda programmes - supported a group’s educational advancement, but without the administrative burdens. (*The word Tanoda stands for formalised, standardised extracurricular after-school programmes).
Typically, the social (rather than the educational) element of the programme included the employment of school social workers. In most places, such an activity was completely new and innovative, and after a hard start, it has become very successful though, sadly, no examples of the employment of school social workers have been found beyond this support programme - neither schools nor local governments have funds to cover this at present.

The educational project elements were implemented typically through involving local experts, teachers and professionals, who got paid for the extra working hours. (This was partly the result of the requirement specification –the programme did not require the employment of “external” professionals, but it also shows the lack of specialists in the least developed micro-regions.)

The PCCP projects could not try, or did not dare to tackle the major structural educational problem of the micro-regions (segregation within and between the institutions). It is a delicate task and still one of the most important issues related to education, which one cannot ignore during the process of micro-regional/district-level development.

Another - very serious - problem also remained unaddressed, notably the issue of early school leavers and of private students. The projects did not address early school leaving as a problem, as it is a relatively new phenomenon. (Because of the reduction of the compulsory age of being in formal education to 16 years old, the number of 16-18-year-old people out of the educational system has been growing. At the start, these people were in a limbo: no longer the clients of the education system, but neither clients of the labour system. This year, this situation changed: more and more municipalities began to offer public work to the referred age group. To continue, even if the primary school activities could be seen as a preventative measure in terms of early school leaving, this goal was usually not included.

During the programme period, the education system underwent important changes (the introduction of all-day schools, the 'change of ownership' of schools, and the centralization of maintenance). These changes could not be anticipated whilst planning the PCCP activities so, in many cases, the projects had to simultaneously adapt to the changed circumstances. This required the need for rewriting and recalculation of the original programme plans – and so delayed the implementation.

The PCCP defined itself as ‘colour-blind’ programme, aiming at the treatment of extreme poverty and child poverty alleviation without any particular Roma targeting. A significant part of local decision-makers (mayors) defined the programme as a "Roma programme" from the beginning. As a result, (and because of the limited source of infrastructural development), there was not much interest in the programme. Here lies the inevitable problem. Roma are in a much higher proportion of extremely poor than non-Roma, so are overrepresented in the target group. This generates a paradoxical situation: officially, it is a colour-blind programme, but with a target

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43 Early school leavers are by those in the 18-24 year old age group who did not do not obtain an ISCED 3 level qualification – in other words, at least a vocational school degree or high school degree- and did not participate in any training up to four weeks before the survey was conducted. (Mártonfi György, Korai iskolaalcgys – Hullámzó trendek. Educatio 2014/1, pp. 36–49, www.hier.iif.hu/hu/letoltes.php?fid=tartalomtor/2304.)
group overrepresented by Roma, many micro-regional programme offices found it difficult to deal with this situation.

The inclusion of Roma was embedded with many instances with difficulties, especially in areas where the facilitators had not previously worked with Roma. When selecting the location of a Sure Start Children’s House or youth club, they did not always take into account the distance from the segregated area. This resulted in several instances in which the target group had to be transported to other settlement areas - typically using village buses. Roma minority self-governments or Roma civil organisations were rarely consulted, listened to, or asked to review plans, i.e. the Roma were left out, so to speak, of the planning stages. Good examples of the inclusion of Roma people were when Roma could be involved in the appointing of staff, who were then trained and integrated into project teams. This led to a higher rate of involvement, and a more precise Roma targeting. Mainly it was Sure Start Children’s Houses and youth clubs that employed not only Roma staff, but also Roma ‘mentors’ and school social workers worked in some places.

Amongst the children involved in the integrated programmes, the Roma – non-Roma issue arose less: Roma and non-Roma parents (in the case of Sure Start Children’s Houses) mutually accepted each other more and more.

8.2 Extracurricular After School Programmes: The Tanoda Programmes

Civil society organisations in Hungary can join in what are known as ‘Tanoda’ programmes when it comes to development processes related to education. Tanodas have increasingly gained support, and – even if their future is uncertain - they have become a semi-official part of the national education system (not least because of their regular subsidies). Although the Tanodas are primarily defined as educational programmes, they can be regarded as complex programmes due to the skill and capacity development work involved, the peer team-building and wider community development aspects of Tanoda programmes through the involvement of parents. Tanodas have operated in Hungary for more than 15 years. These after school programmes were launched by civil and church-related bodies, and were created for disadvantaged, mostly Roma pupils, to promote their school progression and further learning.

The initial projects were mainly realised from civil funding sources, and later EU funds become available. The first call for proposals supporting Tanoda activities was announced in 2004. Since then the organisations that finance the Tanodas activities almost exclusively are channelling EU funds.44

The target group of Tanodas are students of primary and secondary educational institutions. According to the call for proposals, a Tanoda programme aims to increase the opportunities for inclusion of underprivileged children with multiple disadvantages, amongst them Roma children - in order to reduce their educational inequalities and early school leaving. This goal is realised through the use of learning management processes that support learning and are responsive to an individual’s learning needs, through the use of alternative, non-formal and informal forms of

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44It is worth noting that there are more Tanodas operating in Hungary, which have not won EU support for their work, but they can still be operated from other sources, and that several church initiatives have been launched that are also trying to achieve the objectives of the Tanodas.
learning, and through the dissemination and linking of these alternative methods to the formal education system. All of these represent solutions that were only sporadically present in the public education system.

178 Tanodas\textsuperscript{45} were operating in the last round of SoROP fund distributions although, besides this fund, more SoROP Programmes appeared, which supported the implementation of Tanoda-like activities. One could say that the Tanoda programmes have become part of the development support system in that they occupy an increasingly important place. They, of course, respond to the wider educational reform ambitions of the last 15 years (i.e. the Integrated Education System Programme, which supported school integration of disadvantaged, primarily Roma students). Additionally, the Tanoda system is referenced in the national social inclusion strategies. This change is observable in the number of Tanodas. In the HRD OP period (2004-07) there were 67 Tanodas. In the SoROP period (2007-13) there were initially 58 units, but then this number increased to 178.

Tanodas in Hungary

![Map of Tanodas in Hungary](http://tanodaplatform.hu/?page_id=5)

Source: Tanodaplatform, 2015

Despite the fact that the Tanodas extend two decades of history in the national education system, not many studies are available on their results and impact assessment. This report highlights two studies: the 2009 and 2012/2013 reports by TÁRKI Tudok, commissioned by the Roma Education Fund\textsuperscript{46} and the 2012 summary report of the suitability verification test by Eruditio.\textsuperscript{47} The studies arrived at the following main conclusions:

\textsuperscript{45} The list of Tanodas is available here (2015 fall): [http://tanodaplatform.hu/?page_id=5](http://tanodaplatform.hu/?page_id=5).


\textsuperscript{47} Eruditio Oktatási Szolgáltató Zrt, Tanoda beválás vizsgálat tapasztalatainak összefoglalása, 2012.
The programme is well defined, and reaches the target group. The studies have shown that programme participants are disadvantaged and, among them, Roma are over-represented.

Tanodas make the curriculum more "understandable, easier to digest and personalize the learning." The Tanodas provide a supportive space for learning and personal development.\(^48\)

Tanodas play a prominent role in the development of children's positive "self-image". The quantity and quality of the special attention given to children develops their self-esteem and motivation, which contributes to the easier integration and better study performance.

The research has clearly shown that, in addition to the positive effects on students (creativity, love for learning, compliance), the Tanodas also have a serious impact on community building.

Despite the positive effects listed above, the Tanoda programmes face a number of difficulties. The main problems posed by the impact assessments, can be grouped as follows. The first problem, which all surveys outlined, is their financial vulnerability. This problem does not just flag that material resources are scarce, but that the financing system has resulted in many difficulties. The delays of money transfers often made the professional work virtually impossible as Tanodas often had to borrow a loan. The sluggish and bureaucratic Hungarian grant-administration system exacerbates the problem.

The administrative burden of the funding application process also caused, and still causes, key difficulties for the applicants. This is not merely a matter of quality and quantity, but also the frequent changes in administrative obligations, which have proved the greatest burden on the operators of Tanodas.

In close connection with the aforementioned issues, the gap between the closing of tenders and new calls for proposals is often too long and may take up to 12 months, so that continuous operation is not guaranteed. A project is therefore almost impossible to maintain in transitional periods, thus the workers 'scatter' and the results of the work done with students is lost, the children regress, and there is almost the need to re-start the project.

From an educational-methodological perspective, the greatest criticism is that the Tanodas have not been able to incorporate the school curriculum, so the sessions go beyond the subjects. Most Tanodas have frontal teaching\(^49\) characteristics, and there is not enough emphasis on helping students learning to learn.

The goal that the Tanodas should operate as educational workshops and implement various innovative teaching methodologies, has not been reached fully either.

The survey on the Tanodas’ operational, professional and technical background in 2015 was conducted using the framework of the József Eőtvös Programme, where the researchers tried to

\(^{48}\) Polyacskó Orsolya, Tanoda típusú programok, PSIVET, Esélyteremtés, 2013.

\(^{49}\) Frontal instruction or teacher-centred instruction commonly refers to lessons where the teaching activities take place from the front of the classroom (Wikipedia).
reach all EU-funded, operating Tanodas. This report presents the everyday functioning and background of Tanodas based on this research, detailing the aforementioned evaluations.

As also described above, state financed Tanoda programmes, have been working in Hungary nearly for a decade, hence the scope of the current implementing organisations is quite large. Among them, there are some who have decades of history in the sector and there are those who are new ones that have been operating Tanoda for 1-2 years. As the provision of resources has not been continuous, or happened in tender-based systems, a considerable turnover is observable among the implementing organisations. Not every organisation could survive the gap between unfunded periods and calls for proposals without external funding - the project could not be operated and the staff could not be kept. In several cases, for the new call for proposals, the existing experience in previous projects did not mean automatically that the organisation would win and would be able to continue its activities. Furthermore, more than half of the Tanodas were new organisations that fell under the previous funding period. From this entire turnover, more than the half of the Tanodas was newly established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tanoda-related Experience of the Maintaining Organisations</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Having experience with Tanodas</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented educational programme, but not in the form of a Tanoda</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TKKI, 2015

Most of the implementing organisations (95%) in the above-referenced survey, worked in the form of an association or foundation, which was vulnerable to the restrictions related to the eligibility of applicants. Since the beginning of the Tanoda movement, the number of churches and church-related organisations that were amongst the implementers has increased thanks to government efforts in this direction to “outsource” social services to religious organisations.

The functioning of each individual organisation is strongly dependent on the overall Tanoda project, which means they each can only pay its employees if the project is granted money. Consequently, an average of three full-time and six part-time employees work in these organisations - including the staff of the Tanoda programme. Of course, there are organisations that employ a much larger crew and conduct several programmes at a time but, without the grants, these Tanodas would not survive. Among the operating organisations should be highlighted the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta. This organisation is nation-wide and employs hundreds of people. Its Tanoda programmes link to other local development programmes. This organisation runs its Jelenlét programme in a few settlements; this programme

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50 TKKI, Tanoda beválás vizsgálat, 2015 kézirat.
51 The data and tables on Tanodas are from a study, conducted in 2015, for the Türr István Training and Research Institute (TKKI). The research database was created by the voluntary responses of 170 Tanodas; hence, the total responses include answers for a particular question, which is not always the same.
is centrally directed as their flagship project.\textsuperscript{52} Of course, one cannot compare this national organisation with those small organisations that took part in local and regional programmes previously, and their Tanoda work is their first large-scale programme.

From the beginning of systematic Tanoda-funding, the so-called Tanoda standard\textsuperscript{53} included the following quality principles. One very important element of the standard is the definition of the infrastructure for Tanodas. Another is equipment provision. Consequently, for all starting Tanodas one of the fundamental questions is the venue, as the vast majority of organisations do not have a private property, primarily office space is available to them. In 2015, less than a tenth of Tanodas owned their property, 50\% were using buildings owned by municipalities, 16\% leased privately owned real estate and 6\% were able to deliver their programmes in local school buildings. (The latter data is interesting, because the earlier calls banned implementing Tanoda programmes in school buildings whereas the 2014-15-year tender introduced the opportunity to do so.) From the facts described above, it is clear that in two thirds of the buildings occupied by Tanodas, other projects are also running - typically cultural and social activities take place. The buildings are, on average, 140 m\textsuperscript{2}. In this respect; the mixed-use properties are more favourable; they are 40 m\textsuperscript{2} larger. Typically, former cultural centres, community centres become Tanodas, but in most cases, they had to adapt to the particular reality. (There were also cases when a former sports locker room, cinema-building, religious community space have become a scene of a Tanoda.) One-third of the Tanodas can use the community centre, cultural centre or the gymnasium, as required beyond the Tanoda building. This also indicates the common space usage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who owns a Tanoda building?</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing organisation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School (maintainer)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/rented property</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TKKI, 2015

The Tanoda budgets, of course, depend mainly on grants. It is regularly questioned as to when and how the Tanoda activities can become financed on a normative basis – this question is associated with the unlikelihood of continued financing. The fundamental problem of Tanodas is that an ideally continuous and integrational educational activity must be strained and carried out in time-bound project frames and more and more, within limited and strict timeframes. Although the sum of the actions can serve as a whole project, the broader, more comprehensive goal - the education of disadvantaged children and their chance levelling – is rather a long-term process than a time-limited project. The period between grant cycles brings some organisations an

\textsuperscript{52} The basis of the Jelenlét [Presence] Programme by the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta is very intensive, community needs- based social work, which is typically realised in the frame of a community organisation within a segregated area. More in detail on this: http://jelenlet.maltai.hu/mi-a-jelenlet/.

\textsuperscript{53} In the newer grant rounds, there is no Tanoda standard and quality criteria system - it is only 'recommended to reader'.
impossible situation: they cannot keep their staff, their property (where appropriate the venue for the Tanoda) and, in many cases, they lose the local community's trust.

The average Tanoda operates, on average, on HUF 30 million (c. EUR 97k) for 18-24 months, providing services to 25-30 children. According to 86% of the Tanodas, they can carry out the original programme from the available grant amount, with some small modifications. The organisations realise a 12-month Tanoda programme from HUF 20 million (c. EUR 656k) (covering one school year). Almost all Tanoda representatives mentioned the need of higher resources for the salaries of professionals and teachers; the amount currently devoted to this purpose only serves to attract very enthusiastic and motivated people, who would be payed similar salaries to work in other not-for-profit ventures. In the meantime, they should be able to apply specific pedagogical methodology and have up to date professional knowledge. All this shows that, even though this civil initiative has become an institutionalised programme, with the required framework of quality assurance systems and professional networks - it still operates with civil financial background. This is confirmed by the fact that nearly half of all organisations had to ‘pre-finace’ the last 5% grant instalment through loans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource of prefinancing the last 5% of the grant</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal transitive loan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational transitive loan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private loan of project implementers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other grant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other way</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TKKI, 2015

The evaluation of the most recent 2016 Tanoda applications was scandalous: nearly no long-established Tanoda has won, in contrast to many organisations who have not dealt with this type of activity. Typically, church-related organisations and organisations associated with the National Municipality of Roma became winners, and the "old" Tanoda maintainers were rejected - cynically - citing professional reasons. Following nationwide outrage, the Ministry of Human Capacities, opened a new call for tender, for which only the already functioning, and not winning Tanodas can apply.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{54}\) See the analysis of Tanoda platform: [http://tanodaplatform.hu/?page_id=1148](http://tanodaplatform.hu/?page_id=1148)
8.3 Complex Housing Programmes

This report has illustrated that the housing status of Roma is much lower than that of non-Roma residents. Below is an overview of current, coordinated programmes aiming to improve the housing situation of Roma.

The operations of the complex housing programme 2005-2010 were the first attempt after the fall of the Berlin Wall to integrate Roma living in segregated circumstances. It attempted to enable the eradication of settlements, help tenants to attain social housing and, at the same time, support social integration. The settlement eradication programme has proven that its complex nature did help the mobilisation of segregated Roma families to an integrated residential environment.

Another important conclusion was that, without the support of local government, the sites could not be eradicated effectively. In settlements where the municipality has not supported the programme in any way, or indeed has specifically opposed it, the realisation was seriously endangered. The appearance of the municipality within the main applicants as a warranty was an important condition in terms of project feasibility for the programme administrators, as opposed to the financial vulnerabilities of the non-governmental organisations. However, an experienced NGO with adequate capacities in project management was more appropriate, more able to reconcile the various interests, and more flexible to handle problems and conflicts. The small villages were lacking such potent, thus local NGOs and frequently regional NGOs entered the programmes.

In the housing programme, an important conclusion was that the details and costs of such programmes are difficult to plan with complete accuracy. The programmes aimed at the elimination of settlements used the budget primarily for the purchase of used apartments. In the planning phase, the needs of mobilized families and the local real estate market conditions were assessed, and in terms of budgets for renovation, only the limits were defined. Because of the programme, the prices in many places increased, and often the renovations became also more expensive than originally planned. Therefore, the specified budget was often insufficient, resulting in part cancelled reconstructions.

The housing programme also highlighted the fact that, in the settlements, unsettled ownership is a common phenomenon - mortgaging properties and taking out other loans to pay for domestic services and goods takes time and is costly.

In terms of sustainability, the programme provides two important lessons. In many cases, the affordability of higher quality housing was not guaranteed, even shortly after the closing of the programme, despite the fact that its directors tried to prepare families involved for the payment of increased costs. The important lesson learned was that, even if training was integrated throughout the programme period (or even after), along with providing (further/ transit)

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employment, families living in extreme poverty remain, and are increasingly, vulnerable in the labour market not least due to fluctuations of the economic situation. In terms of sustainability of the housing programme, an additional problem was that none of the municipalities or operating NGOs involved had sufficient human and financial resources and capacity to maintain the social housing, even in the short term.

The Complex Site Plan\textsuperscript{56} announced in 2012 embraced two separate support schemes: the social, so-called ‘soft’, elements and the infrastructural investments (to establish social housing). In the case of the latter, providing an integrated housing environment was not a compulsory element.

The programme was originally envisioned to be worked out by local partners (local authorities, social services, child and family support services, relevant educational and cultural institutions, family doctors, nurses and their staff, the competent regional employment centre, local NGOs, and minority self-governments etc.) together with the affected population living in segregated areas. The aim was that these actors would elaborate the proposal of local activities together. The Hungarian grant proposal writing practice is however less favourable for the actual project development; firms tendering for bids typically but not exclusively do not use the above described development process.

The municipalities could apply for the programme grant with settlements. These, in the first instance, must fulfil the criteria of an underdeveloped settlement (i.e. at least 50% of working-age persons have maximum primary education and no regular employment income), and second, the site population is at least 45 people, who collectively live in at least 10 apartments.\textsuperscript{57} Only consortia could apply to implement the local activities. They were obliged to include the Türr István Training and Research Centre (TKKI), the National Roma Self-Government and the local Roma Minority Self-Government.

From the perspective of social integration, it was an important element that the call prescribed intensive social work, i.e. before the start of the implementation, that the conditions of continuous social work had to be established and they had to be sustained in the implementation and maintenance period of the programme.

In addition, the establishment of community development programmes was obligatory. These should include training, if possible, employment programmes, and should focus on the development of children. Sure Start programmes, Tanodas and free time activities were launched. Based on local needs, several programmes could be developed, such as health-related programmes - including public health, preventive health promotion, mental health care - and crime prevention activities. Applicants had complex instruments, which they could combine and dispose properly depending on local needs and demands. It is important that the applications had to include programmes relating to the entire population of a municipality too, in order to ensure local acceptance and to strengthen the relationship between the settlement and locals. It was also essential that within the programme (up to 15% of the costs), it was possible to implement infrastructural elements (e.g. creating a community centre).

\textsuperscript{56} Complex Site Plan, SoROP 5.3.6-11/1, https://www.palyazat.gov.hu/doc/3367.

\textsuperscript{57} The announcement of the Complex Site Programme came in a grant-poor period; it meant that there were a very few open calls, both the NGOs and the municipalities struggled with a significant shortage of funds. Thus a number of municipalities applied for and won, which corresponded to the proposal criteria, but in which a segregated area or site in the classical sense was not present.
In connection with the experiences of the site programmes – although a subsequent initiative - it is worth noting the adobe programme, launched by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs in 2013. The programme aimed to build social family houses for people living in extreme poverty, primarily for Roma, using cheap, readily available, ‘close-to-nature’ building materials (adobe) in the frame of the public work scheme. The programme was launched in 2013 in Gilvánfa, where eight constructions took place. Following the success of the programme, the government decided that in connection with the wind-up of Roma settlements, the extension of the pilot programme would be reasonable. So, in 2014, the programme continued, involving 10 more municipalities and constructing 51 houses. The elimination of segregated areas and the improvement of housing is still a priority government task, to which the aforementioned programme closely relates.\(^5^8\)

The proposals presented so far somewhat deviated from the social urban rehabilitation programmes funded by regional operational programmes, which targeted degraded urban districts - not only settlements, but also residential areas with a more mixed social composition. The aim of the interventions was to improve the living conditions and opportunities of the inhabitants in addition to the physical rehabilitation of neighbourhoods. With this objective, the project designers aimed to realise complex, integrated programmes, which - in addition to physical renovations would focus on social integration of the population.

It is important to note that housing interventions could only take place within the social urban rehabilitation programmes paid for by EU funds. The housing interventions were identified in the original 2007 ERDF regulation.\(^5^9\) The action plan allowed for the refurbishment of common areas of residential buildings to improve energy efficiency and the comfort level of existing local social housing (interiors). The first call was announced in 2007, since then several others followed in specific regions. The application system initially separated a budget framework for county seats, and the other cities could implement such a programme in the tender system.

In summary, the main conclusion of the complex settlement programmes and the social urban regeneration programmes can be formulated as follows - based on the cited housing strategy:

- Most of the programmes were not realised in settlements, or in urban areas with high Roma concentration, but in less deprived areas.
- The level of complexity and integration of the projects was low in most cases. The urban rehabilitation projects focused on infrastructural and other physical interventions (institutional and public area renovations), while the soft programme elements appeared only slightly and with week connection to problems and needs. So, after the project was completed; these soft programmes only sporadically continued on a minimum level.
- In the case of Complex Settlement Programmes, however, the soft programme elements became overriding - and only a small fraction of the settlements undertook infrastructural development too.
- Housing interventions could only be realised in action areas with social housing. The areas containing private family houses dropped out of housing interventions; there were


\(^{59}\) ERDF: European Regional Development Fund.
only infrastructural improvements possible. Housing interventions stayed below actual needs, as the applicant municipalities primarily focused on intervention in industrial and community-owned infrastructure. The housing interventions payed little attention to sustainability (housing costs, affordability), and, in this respect, the integration level of the projects was poor (lack of debt management, focus on proper marketable professions in case of trainings, linking to open labour market programmes, and providing long-term employment). The connection of housing interventions and local housing policy is negligible.

- The sustainability of the projects is usually very a weak element. Typically, after the close of the programme, the soft activities without additional funding pull out of the area (except those with a maintenance obligation) and it can be assumed that the level of benefits also fell to the level prior to the project period.

- The low integration level of local programmes also remains a problem, despite the fact that, in terms of complexity, progress has been made. Although more elements are formed within the local programmes, the synergetic relationship between them remains weak, the programme elements are not built enough on each other. There is no relationship among the programme elements, implementers and the local support system. The public service providers and institutional actors are typically not involved.

- The housing elements of the existing EU programmes did not support the mobilisation of segregated populations (in the social urban rehabilitation programmes it was not possible until 2010 because of EU regulation); housing programmes are generally not related to the local housing policy; the strategic soundness of the latter is typically missing not only small settlements, but also in bigger cities.

- The sustainability of housing interventions in all existing programmes is one of the most critical problems; the affordability of increased housing costs is not ensured.

- The training and employment programmes have not proven to be effective in the sense that, in the long run, they cannot increase the employment rate of the target group. It is also observable that, instead of providing "uniform" solutions, these programmes need to be diversified depending on the overall economic potential / labour market situation of the settlement.

With regards to housing programmes, it is important to note that they affect only municipally-owned social flats; the renovation of private properties is not possible from EU funds. For this reason, those families living in extreme poverty who do not want to, or cannot, sell their properties cannot be beneficiaries of the presented programmes - that is to say, the programme provides an opportunity for the ones in deepest housing poverty, who have no properties (e.g. young families) or whose estates are unfit for habitation. However, the municipalities need to have a local housing regulation, which determines the issue of social housing - in the smaller settlements, this is not prepared yet. The housing orders primarily reflect the possibilities and power relations of the municipalities; these regulations are not typically results of community consultation.

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60 The housing orders are the legal rules of the municipalities, regulating the use of municipal flats, including the social flats.
In summary, the aforementioned complex development programmes are entirely source-dependent, meaning they can operate only when a financial source of support is available. The grant funds are increasingly available in tender-based frames. However, the most needed social developments cannot be concluded in a project-based operation, although a medium or long-term, systematic support could ensure that they are achieved. The local organisations involved do not have the human, infrastructural and financial background that would allow them to finance the programmes from their own resources in periods between tender cycles – so, practically, all the local development processes tend to have to be restarted every 2-3 years. Of course, this is very counterproductive. It has been attempted several times to create such funds that could solve the financial problems at least in one narrow development area (see the Roma Education Fund programmes for Tanodas, or the various micro-credit products for non-governmental organisations), but unfortunately, a stable operating system does not exist.

9. Implementing Organisations and Development Funds Available

The institutionalisation of development funds accompanied the establishment of the corresponding "market": sources with varying intensity and more and more candidates. In accordance with the sector, the related market participants also changed. Since the early '90s until 2004, local Roma NGOs and minority governments were mainly able to apply for such resources; the available funds were small (HUF 100,000 – HUF 1 million / EUR 320 - 3225) and short-term projects (1-year average) were supported.

The aim of these grants was to launch income- and livelihood- supporting activities, with the hope that, in the future, these community enterprises will “grow up”. In addition to the economic subsidies, the ones linked to education were significant; in particular, mainly scholarships and funding for the Tanoda-type activities was available.

Around 2000, the first community centre applications appeared that were trying to bring together the complex activities of the implementing organisations. Civic dominance was observable. The biggest donors were the Soros Foundation, the Autonomia Foundation – and the Public Foundation for Hungarian Gypsies (MACIKA) – which was created on the model of Autonómia.

Since 2004, EU funds have begun to take the place of the domestic development resources (although some were available years after joining the EU, such as the OFA and MACIKA tenders), and all these brought changes in related conditions too. Applicant organisations had to meet more and more bureaucratic conditions, and provide a stable financial and professional background. A significant proportion of Roma NGOs suddenly found themselves alone - they could not contest to EU sources, and the former small-scale applications were either eliminated or significantly changed. This meant the transformation of the tender market (since the type of resources quite significantly determines the circle of applicants for whom such aids are available).

Finally, it is worth contextualising the above within the current organisational and institutional hierarchy.
**Nation-wide Roma organisations** – typically established in the beginning of the ’90s, primarily for protection of interests, and which were later completed with tender activities (e.g. Lungo Drom, Phralipe, Roma Parliament, Roma Polgári Alapítvány, Cigány Szervezetek Országos Szövetsége, Közéleti Roma Nők). In accordance with the requirements of the application system, the rural branch organisations in the country became independent organisations and active participants in the tender sector - this was primarily true for Lungo Drom and Phralipe. The organisations inevitably have loaded a political role as well, since their members were often representatives of the local minority self-governments as well - this duality marked up the system from the small municipal level to the national level.

After 2004, the national organisations attended some large-scale development programmes, but this is now less common. It can be said that the current national associations primarily focus on political movement and advocacy goals and are not involved in the operational programme implementation. Besides Lungo Drom, their operational funding is not stable.

**Nation-wide Pro Roma Organisations** – This group includes such organisations of national scope that do not define themselves as Roma associations, but they do work in favour of Roma, or their activities have a very strong focus on Roma communities (e.g. Autonómia Foundation, Ökotárs Alapítvány, Kárpátok Alapítvány, DemNet, Habitat for Humanity, Hétfa). These foundations and associations typically operate from tender sources although, depending on the situation, they play distributor and programme administrator roles as well. Because of this, the relationship with Roma organisations is changing… once they meet them as beneficiaries and then as partners. Typically, the staff of these organisations is composed of researchers, intellectuals, in many cases consultants, analysts - who also perform tasks for the EU - and transnational organisations and institutions.

**Church-related organisations** – Apart from one or two exceptions, specifically related to one settlement, the churches began to launch a larger proportion of Roma-labelled support programmes in the second half of the 2000s. Currently, out of all the church programmes the activities of the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta stand out. It supports Tanoda programmes, their Jelenlét [Presence] social programme is adapted in more settlements and, in the third round PCCP, they will provide professional support in 30 micro-regions. In general, it must be noted that churches have expanded their activities in the social field; it is likely to continue so in the coming years - mainly providing services related to education for Roma.

**Regional organisations** – We can mention a few Roma organisations whose activities extend beyond their own settlement, or are at micro-regional, regional level (e.g. Dél-somogyi Cigány Képviselők Szövetsége – counties Somogy and Zala, NMCKKSzSz – Nógrád county, Bhim Rao – Borsod county, Dzsaj Bhim – Borsod county, Khetanipe – Baranya county). These organisations work target-oriented (although they started as value-oriented, and from time to time they are forced to do local or political compromises that serve the achievement of an actual purpose). Due to regional operations, they do not have a local community that they represent. They have a background in human resources, which will enable them to successfully apply for national and EU resources. However, there is no stable financial background which, in any case, would allow continuous operation between the tender periods. Their regional embeddedness and relational system is very important for their operation. The regional Roma organisations as partners can participate in large-scale complex programmes, especially doing fieldwork and
keeping the contact with the local Roma community. Depending on the organisation's network, their opinions are regularly consulted in the planning period and in the case of local regional development funds.

**Pro-roma regional organisations** – The work of these organisations is typically both target and value-based. Their activities are interlinked in various charity operation and development programmes (e.g. Ígyazgõny Alapítvány, SZETA, Szent Márton Caritas Alapítvány). They can operate from tender sources, although in their case one can talk about effective and thoughtful alternative fundraising activities as well. These organisations are usually members of regional complex programmes and partnerships; their expertise, experience counts in local development planning.

**Settlement-level organisations** – To them support is mainly available for operating costs (National Cooperation Fund), and small-scale projects related to this source (HUF 1 million / EUR 3225). Very few organisations can provide an appropriate education and professional experience in project management within its membership, and very few have a financial background, which is necessary for the implementation of a successful EU programme. (Due to the intensity of the aid, 10-30% of the total amount should be pre-financed during the programme.) If the above two conditions are met, these organisations have to work in an “application-oriented” fashion in order to maintain their continuous operation. That is to say, they need to apply for the actual tenders - within limits - regardless of an organisation or programme’s professional content. If these local organisations want to operate in the mid-term, they have to enter into partnerships with local, regional and non-Roma organisations that are able to do project management tasks. In many cases, the process is reversed: the proposal-writing, project management organisations are looking for a local Roma organisation, through whom they will be able to tender.

10. **Closing remarks**

As a closing remark, we would like to highlight that in Hungary, a unique situation can be observed in which extreme poverty has a strong ethnic character - The Roma are overrepresented. Researchers estimated that 40-50% of Hungarian people living in extreme poverty are Roma. Granted, poverty in Hungary is not entirely a Roma issue, however, nearly 70-80% of the Roma people belong to this group.

This means that a Roma child has ten times greater a chance of being born into extreme poverty as a non-Roma. The poor, and those living in extreme poverty, are already characterised by much lower advocacy skills, but for the Roma this is multiplied because of the discrimination. The Roma who live in deep poverty - in many ways - are more disadvantaged than the non-Roma living in similar conditions. It follows on that, from the perspective of social utility, it is especially worth supporting Roma communities and organisations and, through them, assist these communities. The national development policy for several years has debated the question, “what could be the most efficient targeting of social development… colour-blind targeting, a territorial approach or affirmative action?” There is no clear answer to the question as has been illustrated
in each programme focussed on in this report, but the possible consequences of the choice of a particular development path need to be carefully analysed.


EU-SILC adatlevétel, 2014.


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